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COMMENT/Bank Mergers and the Six-Headed Monster
"We think sensible accommodation of court and agency
permits nothing less if this six-headed monster created to
regulate bank mergers means anything other than senseless
feuding and a colossal waste of time, effort, and money."'
THE COMMERCIAL BANKS play a vital economic role. So essential is their part,
that it is not surprising to find them the subject of extensive regulation.2 It
might, in fact, surprise one that banks compete at all. Current interest rates
demonstrate, however, that they do compete and virulently so. Between the
maximum and minimum interest rates, fixed for practical purposes by gov-
ernment regulation, lies an area of considerable play. The prevailing "prime"
rate, however, generally hovers a fraction of a per cent above the minimum.
The combined effects of regulation and competition force the banking
industry to operate on a relatively thin margin. On the other hand, salaries,
accounting services, furnishings, etc.-general operating costs-have steadily
increased. The resulting "fixed-income inflation squeeze" is a phenomenon
familiar to every homeowner. The obvious answer to a thinner margin of
profit is increased volume. Sound banking regulation, however, limits this
solution. Maximum lending limits reflecting the volume of deposits are im-
posed by law. The solution, then, demands an increase in deposits. While
banks can bring some promotional influence to bear in this area, in large part
deposits are governed by the factor of neighborhood convenience. Recogniz-
ing this factor banks "follow their deposits market into the suburbs" by open-
ing new branches, "de novo branching." In most states, however, such branch-
ing is restricted, in some prohibited altogether.3 In all cases the solution is
clumsy. Management often becomes a problem, not to mention the large in-
itial outlay of funds.
'Judge Lloyd MacMahon in Manufacturers Hanover, infra note 48, at 80,719. The six-
heads are: The Department of Justice, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Re-
serve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the state banking agencies, and the courts.
2 Space will not be taken to outline the "manifold ... governmental controls of American
banking .. " Some idea of the extent of such controls is given by Justice Brennan in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 327-330 (1963).
8 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 § 106 (1963) (prohibited); VERNON'S ANNO. MO. STATS.
§ 362.155 (1951), TENN. CODE § 45-211 (1964) (restricted).
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Beset with these woes, banks instinctively turn to the merger device to in-
crease lending limits and cultivate, by the branching effect, local deposits
markets. Other advantages follow. Management duplication is reduced. In
most cases accounting costs per dollar of deposits are reduced. Frequently a
merger prevents suspension of a failing bank's charter; in such distressed sit-
uations the "shotgun" 4 merger benefits the entire community.
In light of all this, it is not surprising that during recent years the number
of all banks consumed by mergers exceeds the number of new banks em-
barking on these choppy waters. 5 The resulting concentration, however, is a
banking fact-of-life onto which legal consequences have recently attached.
The tale of these consequences, the subject of this Comment, begins with
mention of three federal statutes: the Clayton Act,6 the Sherman Act,7 and
the Bank Merger Act.8
II. THE STATUTES
The Clayton Act, as passed in 1914, provided:
Sec. 7. That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce. 9
The act was designed to do many things that the Sherman Act had proved
unable to do. Sherman required, for example, proof of an actual restraint of
trade. Under it a combination of two competing dominant giants would yield.
Where, however, the same resulting dominance was accomplished by a series
of individually insignificant combinations, Sherman was powerless. In short,
Sherman could reach the "swallow" but not the series of individual "bites."
In response to these inadequacies Clayton was passed. Section 7 of that act
'"Shotgun merger" denotes an emergency merger of a failing or insolvent bank into a
more sturdy bank, often as an alternative to greater disasters.
On January 1, 1950, there were 14,174 commercial banks in the nation. In the 1950's 887
new banks were chartered, but 1,503 banks were absorbed by mergers and 98 other banks
discontinued business for other reasons, yielding a total of 13,460 such banks on December
31, 1959. H. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1995,
1998. Since 1960 the decrease has continued until 1963; in the past two years the number
of banks extant has increased somewhat. Hearings on S. 1698 before the Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1965). The Supreme Court decision in Philadelphia, infra, has much to do with
this otherwise inexplicable reverse in "the merger movement."
638 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1964).
726 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
8 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (c) (1964).
9 Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 731-732.
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was designed "to arrest in its incipiency,"' 0 "to nip... in the bud,"" the sub-
stantial lessening of competition caused by corporate combinations. By its
terms a showing that the condemned effect had in fact occurred was unnec-
essary; it sufficed simply to show that it might.12 "Reasonable probability" or
"threat" became the test. In duPont, 3 for example, the questioned transac-
tion was thirty years old; the district court concluded that thirty years of non-
restraint negated any reasonable probability of present or future restraint.
However, the Supreme Court, reversing, held that the district court's undis-
puted findings of fact led to the opposite conclusion. Under Clayton it was
no longer essential to pinpoint a transaction and show that it, in and of itself,
constituted a restraint of trade. It was enough to show that the denounced
transaction represented a piece of a larger mosaic. The provision for viewing
the transaction in the context of "any section or community" and in "any
line of commerce" allowed a telescoping into every meaningful economic
plane. After initial hesitation the term "corporation engaged in commerce"
was found applicable to banking.' 4
The weak link in the scheme proved to be the provision prohibiting inter-
corporate acquisitions of "stock or other share capital." Asset acquisitions,
the ultimate goal of such stock acquisitions, were paradoxically immune.
While the section might conceivably have been judicially expanded, 5 it was
not.
In 1950 Congress amended §7 to read:
... no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where ... the effect ... may be ... " (emphasis added) 6
Did Congress intend to close one loophole by opening another? The ques-
tion was to haunt the Supreme Court thirteen years later. Was a legislative
10 United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
Transamerica Corporation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 206
F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953). ". . . to arrest apprehended consequences of inter-corporate
relationships before those relationships could work their evil." duPont, supra note 10. "...
in their incipiency and before consummation . . ." S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.l.
12The "condemned effect" had to be a substantial one. Cf. Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922), where the Court pointed out that some reduc-
tion in competition always results from a horizontal merger, but that in order for the com-
bination to be struck down the reduction had to be substantial. See, also, United States v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., TRADE REG. RE'. 71,408 at 60,762 (1965), where Mac-
Mahon, J. pointed out that concentration had to be shown to be "undue" before the result
was prohibited.
r du Pont, supra note 10.
14 Transamerica, supra note 11.
15H. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1949).
1838 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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grant of Clayton Act immunity intended for those industries beyond the ju-
risdiction of the FTC? If so, why? Perhaps Congress chose distinct enforce-
ment channels for the "regulated" and "unregulated" sectors of the economy.
Perhaps, too, a more inclusive amendment could not have gained passage.
17
Nevertheless, during the 1950's in terms of purely statistical results, the
Sherman-Clayton Act combination was viewed as a failure in preventing a
parade of bank mergers and a corresponding steady increase in concentra-
tion in the commercial banking industry. The Congressional response to this
pattern was the Bank Merger Act of 1960, an act to amend § 18 (c) of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act. The 1960 Act prohibited insured banks from
merging or consolidating with any other insured banks
without the prior written consent (i) of the Comptroller of the Currency if the
acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a national or a District bank, or
(ii) of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System if the acquiring,
assuming or resulting bank is to be a State member bank (except a District
bank), or (iii) of the Corporation [FDIC] if the acquiring, assuming, or result-
ing bank is to be a nonmember insured bank (except a District bank).
The Act outlined substantive criteria for the granting of approval by the re-
spective agencies:
In granting or withholding consent under this subsection, the Comptroller,
the Board, or the Corporation, as the case may be, shall consider the financial
history and condition of each of the banks involved, the adequacy of its capital
11 An extensive memorandum was prepared by Matthew Hale, Chief of Staff, Senate Bank-
ing and Currency Committee, entitled "Legislative History of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
and Its Relation to the Bank Merger Act of 1960." It is set out on page 324 of the 1965
Hearings, infra note 77. The memorandum describes two bills in special detail: H.R. 2734,
81st Cong., Ist Sess (1949) and H.R. 5948, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955). The former bill
passed and became the Celler-Kefauver 1950 amendment to Clayton Act § 7. Mr. Hale pre-
sents convincing evidence that the bill was passed with the complete understanding that
assets acquisitions of corporations not subject to the FTC would be immune. Mr. Hale
comments:
While the record does not disclose any statement of a reason for this decision, it may
well have been based on the feeling that the addition of such a provision [to include,
say, banks, etc.] would have resulted in the defeat of the bill. It seems pertinent to
point out that Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1950, which would have transferred to
the Secretary of the Treasury all the powers of officials in the Treasury Department,
including the Comptroller of the Currency, was defeated by a vote of 65 to 13, on the
ground that the Comptroller's functions should be left vested in him (96 CONG. REc.
6891, 6898, (1950).
The latter bill, H.R. 5948, introduced by Congressman Celler in 1955, would have placed
bank mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The bill was passed in the House on
February 6, 1956, but was killed in Senate committee. When S.1062 (86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
the bill that became the Bank Merger Act of 1960) was debated on the House floor, Con-
gressman Celler reluctantly supported it, stating that he would have preferred more rigor-
ous legislation along the lines of § 7. Conceding that Congress had a "grand design" in
1950, the evidence is overwhelming that the Supreme Court in 1963 had an even "grander"
one.
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structure, its future earnings prospects, the general character of its management,
the convenience and needs of the community to be served, and whether or not
its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this Act. In the case of a
merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption of liabilities, the ap-
propriate agency shall also take into consideration the effect of the transaction
on competition (including any tendency toward monopoly), and shall not ap-
prove the transaction unless, after considering all of such factors, it finds the
transaction to be in the public interest. (emphasis supplied)
Unless an emergency is found to exist, the Act also requires, "in the interests
of uniform standards"' 8 the approving agency to request from the Attorney
General and the other two agencies reports on the competitive factors in-
volved.
The overriding theme of the Bank Merger Act of 1960 was that existing
laws were inadequate to deal with the policing of bank mergers from an anti-
trust standpoint.
Because secion 7 [of the Clayton Act] is limited, insofar as banks are con-
cerned, to cases where a merger is accomplished through acquisition of stock,
and because bank mergers are accomplished by asset acquisitions, the act offers
"little help," in the words of Hon. Robert A. Bicks, acting head of the Antitrust
Division, in controlling bank mergers. Although the Sherman Act applies to
asset acquisitions as well as to stock acquisitions, it has been of little use in con-
trolling bank mergers. 19
The scheme, then, provided by'Congress in the Bank Merger Act of 1960
was premised first, on the conclusion that existing laws were inadequate, and
second, on a conclusion that this inadequacy was due to the fact that bank
mergers are accomplished by asset acquisitions rather than by stock acqui-
sitions. The necessary middle term in the syllogism, the key term, is missing:
that whatever type of asset acquisition it is by which banks merge, it is that
type of asset acquisition over which Congress in 1950 imposed §7 sanctions
limited strictly to corporations subject to the FTC. It is primarily on this key
middle term that the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank20 took issue with the 86th Congress' interpretation of the intent
18 In his Report to Congress for 1964 the Comptroller of the Currency suggested jettison-
ing the advisory opinions of the Attorney General and the other two banking agencies from
the Bank Merger Act. They represent, he argued, a judgment on only one factor. "Never-
theless, differences between the advisory opinions and the decisions on mergers have often
been falsely cited as evidence of differences in merger policy among the banking agencies.
Moreover, five years of experience under the Bank Merger Act have demonstrated that the
advisory opinions of the banking agencies not faced with the responsibility of the decision
are ordinarily routine and rarely present facts or ideas unknown to the responsible agency.
There seems to be no proper reason for continuing this procedure." ANTITRUsT & TR. REG.
REP. No. 217, A-7 (1965).
19 H. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1995, 2002.
0374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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of the 81st Congress. The Supreme Court in Philadelphia conceded that the
middle term in the syllogism was, indeed, the clear inference given by the
1960 Congress. It pointed out, however, an essential fact to note here: that a
1960 Congressional gloss placed on a 1950 enactment is not legislative in-
tent.2 1 By no means, however, does it argue to the contrary conclusion, and
legislative research subsequently undertaken reveals that the 1960 Congress,
beyond any reasonable doubt, had in point of fact correctly read the intent
of the 1950 Congressl What should have been made clear in Philadelphia,
however, was that if the evils of bank concentration were perceived by Con-
gress in 1960, there were clearly two remedial roads open: bank regulatory
legislation, the road taken, and further amendment to §7, the more obvious
approach. The House Report on the Bank Merger Act of 1960 suggests a
reason for the road taken:
Because banking is a licensed and strictly supervised industry that offers prob-
lems acutely different from other types of business, the bill vests the ultimate
authority to pass on mergers in the Federal bank supervisory agencies, which
have a thorough knowledge of the banks, their personnel and their types of busi-
ness. ...
... out of the hearings one principle emerged, on which all witnesses seemed
to agree, as a starting point: Some bank mergers are in the public interest, even
though they lessen competition to a degree. (emphasis supplied)22
If the bill vests ultimate authority to pass on mergers in the agencies, on
whom does the initial authority rest? The point needs belaboring no further.
Honesty demands, however, the admission that the legislative intent behind
the Bank Merger Act, no matter how clear and convincing, is not in any way
conclusive of whether Clayton Act §7 applies to banks. In 1960 Congress was
working on the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. How they would have amend-
ed the Clayton Act in 1960 seems fairly apparent, but the point is the 86th
Congress did not touch the Clayton Act. Why? Congress was laboring under
a factual assumption the Supreme Court was about to prove untrue-that
conventional antitrust laws were inapplicable to the commercial banking
industry.
The bill became law, but dissatisfaction with commercial bank regulation
continued. The Comptroller of the Currency revealed a permissive policy
toward national bank mergers. The "merger movement" proceeded apace;
the advisory report of the Attorney General became something to be noted
and filed. Something, it seemed, needed to be done. Something was about to
be done.
"'[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the in-
tent of an earlier one.' United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313;" United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank, id., at 348-9.
12Supra note 19, at 2002.
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III. THE EIGHT CASES
Eight bank mergers have been challenged in court by the Justice Depart-
ment. The cases were chosen with care-each contains its own peculiar twist,
each is designed to open a new aspect. Because each is set in unique facts and
since they represent an orderly logical development, it seems appropriate to
consider them individually.
A. Philadelphia
Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank, sec-
ond and third largest in the metropolitan area, agreed in 1960 to merge with
Philadelphia's national charter. Girard assets were to be exchanged for shares
in the resulting institution (an assets acquisition). The resulting bank would
be the largest in the area and would control over one-third of that banking
market. The increase in concentration would be large. Advisory reports from
the agencies and Attorney General were unanimously unfavorable. Never-
theless, the Comptroller, finding beneficial economic effects and adequate
local banking alternatives, approved the merger. On the following day Justice
instituted a Sherman §1 and Clayton §7 proceeding. 23 Following a trial in
which the government relied almost exclusively on Sherman §1, the district
court held §7 inapplicable and §1, while applicable, not violated.24 Appeal
was taken directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act,25 where
the judgment was reversed.
26
Justice Brennan conceded that if this consolidation were to be viewed as an
asset acquisition §7 would be inapplicable. He traced, however, a line of prior
decisions27 holding §7 inapplicable to mergers and found this frailty the set-
ting into which the Celler-Kefauver 1950 amendment fit. The amendment
was viewed as part of a grand "congressional design" to close loopholes in the
antitrust laws. Thus, the asset acquisition exemption for corporations not
subject to the FTC covered only "pure assets acquisitions"-i.e. ... when
not accomplished by merger.
'28
Legislative history was found to support the view that mergers were to be
viewed "basically" as stock transactions and to show a design "to place cor-
porate mergers on the same footing", whether resulting in stock or asset ac-
3 Civil A. No. 29287, E.D.Pa., (1961).
201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D.Pa. 1962).
232 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
"United States v. Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank,
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
'7Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 291 U.S. 587 (1934);
Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); United States v.
Celanese Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
2 In commercial banking such transactions are of virtually no commercial importance, as
members of the Federal Reserve System may not hold for their own account investment
securities of any one obliger in excess of 10% of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus.
12 U.S.C. §§ 24 "Seventh," 335 (1964).
1965]
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quisitions. Since the transaction was no longer, really, an asset acquisition,
the FTC limitation was nicely avoided. Crowning this portion of the opinion
was the judicial chestnut that "immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly
implied."
29
The Court concluded that the Bank Merger Act did not grant antitrust
immunity to commercial banking. The conclusion is well supported. In 1960
there was nothing to grant immunity from. The banks urged the Bank Mer-
ger Act immunity argument at trial; on appeal, however, the argument was
abandoned.3 0 Finally, the Court found the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
inapplicable. In effect this finding totally emasculated the administrative
role of the banking agencies in the merger cases. This is the precise holding
that seemingly flies in the face of the Bank Merger Act.
New ground was plowed in Philadelphia. In the following term the Su-
preme Court was prepared to take the next logical step.
B. Lexington
Here the First National Bank of Lexington and Security Trust Co., the first
and fourth largest banks in the area, agreed to form by merger the largest
bank in Fayette County. The resulting bank would control 54% of the local
bank loan market. The merger's black-eye, however, was its effect on the local
trust business. The consolidated institution would have cornered the market
with control of 95% of the local trust assets.8 1 The Philadelphia and Lexing-
ton mergers occurred only a few months apart. Over strongly adverse reports
from the Attorney General and the other two banking agencies the Comp-
troller approved. Justice immediately brought a Sherman §§1,2 action. On di-
rect appeal from a district court finding of no violation,3 2 the Supreme Court
reversed and held that the merger violated Sherman §1.33
2 This argument is perhaps the most wobbly. Cited as authority for this "canon of con-
struction" was California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962), the "first
El Paso" case, decided the previous term. This decision can be said to have foreshadowed
Philadelphia. There a divided court held that a publicly regulated industry in which the
FPC must consider competitive effects before approving mergers, etc., was not immune to
§ 7 of the Clayton Act. But see Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 990, 996 (1964), discussing this
factor. As that Comment indicates, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 296 (1963), would have provided some basis for the opposite conclusion. If a genuine
basis for a factual distinction existed, as the author of that Comment believed, it was suffi-
ciently narrow to preclude the aphoristic solution reached in Philadelphia.
10 There has been considerable dismay at the fact that the point was not argued or briefed
at the Supreme Court level. Why was it abandoned as an argument? It is believed that the
answer is a tactical one, to be found somewhere in California.
81 The next largest area bank in terms of trust assets was Citizens Union Bank, with 3.4%
of the local business.
8 United States v. First National Bank of Lexington, 208 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.Ky. 1962).
Only after Lexington was on appeal to the Supreme Court did the Philadelphia revolution
occur. In his dissent Justice Harlan was critical of the government's attempt to back the
case out of Sherman and into the rejuvenated Clayton Act. 376 U.S. 679-80.
1United States v. First National Bank of Lexington, 376 U.S. 673 (1964).
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Justice Douglas, writing a laconic majority opinion focused almost exclu-
sively on the trust service submarket. The principal anti-competitive vice was
found to be the
... 'image' of 'bigness' [which] is a powerful attraction to customers, an advan-
tage that increases progressively with disparity in size; and ... the multiplicity
of extra services in the trust field which the new company could offer [which]
tends to foreclose competition there.34
Invoked at this point was a litany of four elderly railroad antitrust cases.8 5
These four decisions were called upon to sustain the principle
where merging companies are major competitive factors in a relevant market,
the elimination of significant competition between them by merger or consolida-
tion, itself constitutes a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.36
The idea was not wholly original. The government advanced the same prin-
ciple, supported by the same four cases, in United States v. Columbia Steel
Co. 3 7 In holding that acquisition not violative of §1 the Court was able to
breezily dispatch the old railroad quartet:
We do not stop to examine those cases to determine whether we would now ap-
prove either their language or their holdings. The factual situation in all those
cases is so dissimilar from that presented here [ I ] that they furnish little guid-
ance in determining whether the competition which will be eliminated ... is
sufficient to warrant [the] ... relief requested by the government.38
The technique used to revive the railroad quartet was equally terse: "The
Columbia Steel case must be confined to its special facts."3 9
After the Supreme Court ruling the agonies of divestment began. With-
84 Id., at 669.
w"The case, we think, is governed by Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197 [1904], and its progeny." Lexington, supra note 33, at 670. The "progeny" are: United
States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S.
26 (1920); and United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922).
8Lexington, supra note 33, at 671-2.
- 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
8 Id., at 531.
39 Lexington, supra note 33, at 672. "It is difficult to see how features peculiar to banking
or indeed any other features of a particular case which, in reason, should lead to a different
result, can stand up against the bludgeon with which the Court now strikes at combinations
which may well have no fault except 'bigness'." Justice Harlan, dissenting in Lexington, id.
at 673, 680. Justices Brennan and White concurred in reversal, but would have turned the
case directly on Columbia Steel. To a large extent the Court's lack of enthusiasm for Colum-
bia Steel must be seen in terms of personnel changes. In Lexington the five justices voting
to distinguish Columbia Steel were Justices Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, and Goldberg.
In Columbia Steel (1948) only two members of the present Court were sitting-Justices
Black and Douglas. Both dissented in Columbia Steel. Hence, Lexington's summary con-
finement of Columbia Steel to its "special facts" might well be viewed as tacit repudiation
of the case.
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drawal was made particularly painful by the severe restraints Kentucky places
on branching. 40 The Eastern District of Kentucky ordered First Security to
create a separate bank that would be the competitive equal of the former
Security Trust Co.41 Later a $100 per day contempt fine was imposed on the
recalcitrant bank. In April, 1965, Justice Stewart, one of the dissenters, granted
a stay of the divestment order pending further appeal to the Supreme Court.42
When Justice filed its complaint and moved for a preliminary injuction,
the two banks, it is understood, assured the court that during the pendency
of the litigation separate books would be kept in the event divestment re-
sulted. Either the books were not kept separate or the plan proved ill-advised,
for the banks were later to argue that separation was impossible. 48 Apparently
the district court on remand sympathized, in view of the form the final order
took.
C. Manufacturers Hanover
In September, 1961, Manufacturers Trust Co. and The Hanover Bank agreed
to merge under a New York State charter. Manufacturers, a retail bank, was
the fifth largest in New York, sixth nationally, and had 120 branches. Its mil-
lion-plus depositors had an average balance of $3000. The bank was formed
on the ashes of several smaller banks reputedly wiped out with Morgan mon-
ey. Hanover, a wholesale bank, was the eighth largest in New York, four-
teenth nationally, and had ten branches. It served 44,000 pedigreed depositors
with an average balance of $39,000.44 While the two banks did not deal in
two entirely distinct, non-competing lines of banking business (Hanover gave
some retail services and Manufacturers some wholesale), by and large their
lines of business were fairly termed "complementary." Before this merger
Manufacturers had grown in the past through lesser mergers of its own;45
10 Ky. REv. STATS. § 287.180 (1963).
"'[Security trust must be given back] its name, its directors, its officers and personnel,
its offices, furniture and equipment, its capital surplus and undivided profits, and loans,
savings, checking and trust accounts plus its proportionate share of any increments and
improvements since that date." ANTITRUST & TR. REG. REP. No. 196, April 13, 1965 A-2,3,
B-2, and No. 193 Mar. 23, 1965, A-10.
First Security National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington v. United States. Docket No.
141. Supreme Court. October Term, 1965.
,1 Testimony of the presidents of First National's competitors in Lexington, Ky., Hearings
before the Subcommittee of the House Banking and Currency Committee on Domestic
Finance __ . September 14, 1965.
"The retail-wholesale contrast is seen in loans activity: Manufacturers had 208,000 bor-
rowers with an average loan of $7000. Hanover had 4,500 borrowers with an average loan of
$214,000. Manufacturers had total assets of $3.8 billion (8.7% of the metropolitan total and
2.7% of the national figure), deposits of $3.5 billion (9.1% of the local and 2.7% of the
national figure), and loans of $1.5 billion (7.4% of the local and 2.1% of the national mar-
kets). Hanover had total assets of $2.2 billion (4.9% of the local, 1.5% of the national totals),
deposits of $1.7 billion (4.6% of the local, 1.5% of the national totals), and loans of $0.9
billion (4.5% of the local, 1.4% of the national figures).
'5 In 1950 Manufacturers merged with the Brooklyn Trust Co. Since 1940 it had also
merged five smaller banks.
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Hanover was a merger virgin. Taken into account when the merger was un-
der consideration was the fact that the resulting institution would not only
inherit the essential experienced management and personnel to conduct
both retail and wholesale operations, but would also attain a significantly
expanded lending limit needed to meet the particularly virulent New York
City banking competition. No "shotgun" element was present in this trans-
action; both banks were successful, sound, with no crisis in sight.
The merged institution, The Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., became
the third largest in New York, fourth nationally. Favorable advisory reports
were made by the Comptroller and the FDIC to the approving agency, the
Federal Reserve Board.46 The Attorney General's report contained anticom-
petitive objections. The merger was approved, and Justice filed its Clayton
§7 and Sherman §1 complaint in the Southern District of New York.47 District
Judge Cashin denied a temporary restraining order (Philadelphia had not
yet reached the Supreme Court). Following trial, during which Philadel-
phia came down, the Southern District held, in an exhaustive opinion by
Judge MacMahon, that approval of the merger by the FRB conferred no
antitrust immunity, that the merger constituted a combination in restraint
of national and local banking in violation of Sherman §1, and that there was
a "reasonable probability" that the merger would "substantially lessen" com-
petition in these same markets, in violation of Clayton §7.48
Judge MacMahon reached the conclusion with anything but enthusiasm.
Although Philadelphia had now precluded the argument of antitrust immu-
nity through the Bank Merger Act, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction pre-
sented an interesting twist: In both Philadelphia and Lexington the result-
ing bank was to be national; hence the Comptroller was the approving agency.
Because, however, Manufacturers Hanover was to be a state bank, the FRB
was the approving agency. Clayton §11 vests "authority to enforce compli-
ance [with §7] in the Federal Reserve Board where applicable to banks."49
Hence the dismissal of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in Philadelphia
was distinguishable; in Manufacturers there would be no "positive repug-
nance" between the Bank Merger Act and Clayton §11.50 The Southern Dis-
trict seized the opportunity to hold Clayton §11 applicable and make an "ad
hoc application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction." Nonetheless, Clayton
"eState law required the approval of the New York Superintendent of Banks. N.Y.
BANKING LAw § 601-b. The approval was given.
'7 61 Civil No. 3194, S.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 1961.
"1 United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., TRADE REG. REP. 71, 408 p. 80, 713.
1938 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21. (1964).
5°Manufacturers Hanover, supra note 48, at 80,717. That is, in Philadelphia the Bank
Merger Act placed sole authority to approve the merger in the Comptroller, inconsistent
with the § 11 administrative authority vested in the Federal Reserve Board. In Manufac-
turers, however, the Federal Reserve Board was the agency called upon by both enforce-
ment schemes.
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clearly provided a "dual scheme of enforcement,",' and, the court pointed
out, going back to start "at this stage of the litigation would be little short
of ridiculous." The middle ground between ad hoc primary jurisdiction and
its reluctant acceptance of Philadelphia was a ruling that:
... we will accept the agencies' views about banking facts, including the nature
of the business of the constituent banks, the existence and locus of effective com-
petition for all types of accounts, and the practicable banking alternatives of
particular classes of customers as persuasive and helpful evidence in our analysis
of the competitive effect of this merger ..., but the agencies conclusions of law
on the antitrust questions as such, including the competitive effect of this mer-
ger, are not binding upon us in our independent application of the antitrust
laws.
5 2
Thus began the tour. The government's atomization of the commercial
banking market into individual banking services was rejected. Instead, two
relevant lines of commerce were found: wholesale and retail banking. If the
relevant line presented difficulties, determination of the appropriate geo-
graphic market was a problem of mammoth proportions.
The position of the banking agencies and parties that some wholesale mar-
kets were partly local and partly national was rejected. Rather, two distinct
geographic markets, national and local, were used. But what fit the defini-
tions of local, national, wholesale, and retail? Here the court's discussion of
ad hoc primary jurisdiction made sense. Application of the verbal tool-
whether or not banks encounter effective nationwide competition for a par-
ticular kind or size of account-would have been impossible without the Fed-
eral Reserve findings, which under "our ad hoc application of ... primary
jurisdiction" "may well be conclusive .. ., for they were clearly based on sub-
stantial evidence."5 3
After establishing the structural context, the court approached its Clayton
tests. Throwing up his hands at the "distorted" evidence presented, Judge
MacMahon refused even to attempt a "market share" test. After invoking
Gilbert and Sullivan to chasten the government for suggesting that the court
"fudge" this evidenciary gap, the court passed to the "competitive effect"
test. Here the quick formulas were rejected. "Bigness" was held not per se il-
legitimate. ("such [emotional] pleas generally mask a meritless case. .. ") The
resulting foreclosure of a certain market share was also, in itself, inconclu-
sive. (Otherwise, all horizontal mergers would be illegal.) Nor could "in-
" The district courts are given jurisdiction under Clayton § 15 (15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964)) con-
current with that of the Federal Reserve Board where applicable to banks under Clayton
§ 11 (15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964)).
Supra note 48, at 80,720.
'Id., at 80,750, citing 15 U.S.C. § 21(c), Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans,
379 U.S. 411 (1965).
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creased concentration" be deemed determinative. (Not all concentration is
"undue.")
After tens of thousands of words had been spent destroying the case, the
postea was unceremoniously awarded to the government. Undue concentra-
tion was found in the local market, and a long-range trend toward further
concentration was exhibited.54 The merger was found to eliminate a major
competitor, reduce the number of potential banking alternatives, and gather
"more branches [into] still fewer hands." Clayton §7 and Sherman §1 were
held violated in both markets. 55
A divestment agreement was reached between the parties. Attorney Gen-
eral Katzenbach announced that "for a variety of business reasons" the de-
tails would not be disclosed. 56 The agreement, an ill-kept secret, called for the
spin off of about 42 branches. As this Comment goes to press, Judge Mac-
Mahon has yet to give his fiat to this bargain. In September, Congressman
Todd introduced in the House H.R. 10851, a bill for the private relief of
Manufacturers Trust Co. and the Hanover Bank.
57
Justice won another significant victory, but had been given in the process
lessons on how not to handle an antitrust case before the Southern District.
D. Continental Illinois
Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co., Chicago's second largest bank, tenth
nationally, and City National Bank & Trust Co., the city's sixth largest,
agreed to merge in September, 1961, under Continental's national charter.
At that time the Chicago banking market was more concentrated than the
corresponding New York market. The four largest Chicago banks then con-
trolled 62% of the deposits and 70% of the loans in the city. The proposed
merger would increase these figures to 65% and 73%.
The Comptroller approved the merger over serious antitrust objections
Manufacturers Hanover, supra note 48, at 80,764-80,771. Major causes were the Chemi-
cal-Corn Exchange-New York Trust mergers, the Chase-Manhattan merger, the First Na-
tional-National City Bank merger, and the Bankers Trust-Public National merger, all within
the past decade. In 1954 the five largest banks had 63% of New York City's 207 branches; after
the merger in question they had 81%.
"Id., at 80,755. "This merger offends Clayton § 7 in so many ways that to allow it to
stand would be to ignore the statute altogether. It tends to create a monopoly by signifi-
cantly increasing concentration and accelerating a trend toward oligopoly ..... where there
is a strong trend toward oligopoly, further trends in that direction are to be curbed in
their incipience....
... the merger substantially lessens competition and restrains trade by the permanent
elimination of significant competition formerly existing between major competitors, and
that in 'itself constitutes a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act,' and, a fortiorari of the
Clayton Act."
16 ANTITRUST & TR. REG. REP. No. 210, July 20, 1965, A-7.
6 At the same time Rep. Todd introduced five other bills for private relief of other banks
whose mergers have been struck down for antitrust reasons. The bills are designed to re-
duce the confusion of issues involved in other pending legislation. See SOLUTIONS, infra.
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raised by Justice, who filed a week later its Clayton §7 and Sherman §1 ac-
tion in the Northern District of Illinois. 58 A temporary restraining order was
denied and the merger was consummated.5 9 After four years the case has yet
to reach the trial stage; discovery is still in process. The case contains its own
twist. Should the merger be voided-and, it is submitted, a stronger case is
presented here than was present in Manufacturers-the Illinois prohibition
against branching will cause perplexing divestiture problems. Because spin-
ning off branches will be impossible, the court will have to invent. It is un-
derstood that this is the factor bogging down the proceedings.
E. Crocker Citizens
Involved in this pending case is the merger of Crocker-Anglo National Bank,
San Francisco, fifth largest in California (124 branches in northern Califor-
nia) and Citizens National Bank, Los Angeles, eighth largest (78 branches
in southern California). Both banks have fed on prior mergers-Crocker,
nine, and Citizens, three. Transamerica Corporation has working control of
Citizens. The resulting bank, Crocker-Citizens National Bank, the state's
fourth largest, would control almost one-tenth of the state's banking busi-
ness. All California banks, however, stand in the shadow of the giant, the
Bank of America, N.T. &c S.A., San Francisco, the nation's largest commercial
bank (818 branches).60
The state's unique geography presents a special twist. The Tehachapi
Mountains form a natural barrier between northern and southern California.
Between these two sections there are marked differences in types of business,
methods of doing business, kinds of industries and occupations, and there are
wide differences in the mores of the people and even in the manner in which
they dress.61
The Comptroller granted conditional approval of the merger in Septem-
ber, 1963. 62 A week later Justice filed a Clayton §7 and Sherman §1 complaint
in the Northern District of California, naming both banks and Transamerica
as defendants, and seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction. In
November, 1963, the district court in a per curiam opinion denied the in-
junction. Philadelphia and Lexington were quickly distinguished. The geo-
5 8Civil No. 61-C-1441, N.D. Ill., August 29, 1961. One agency, the FDIC, reported favorably.
61 TRADE REG. REP. 45,061 (Case 1624), at 52,440, (1965).
GThe Bank of America has assets of $11.9 billion, deposits of $10.8 billion, and loans of
$6.7 billion. The nation's largest bank, it dwarfs by comparison all California competitors.
61 The geographic factor is reflected in the branching patterns of California banks. Crocker
and Citizens had only a slight "lap over" in territory, Ventura and Santa Barbara counties,
although both were multi-branched. United States v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank, Civil
No. 41808, N.D. Cal., Nov. 1, 1963.
e The condition attached was that Transamerica dispose of its controlling stock in Citi-




graphical factor weighed heavily; the court found virtually two markets, no
likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition, and a fortiorari no clear
Sherman violation. Justice's alternative argument that the merger consti-
tuted a territory division per se in violation of Sherman was dismissed as "a
complete non sequitur." The court accepted the banks' argument that merg-
er would effect the entry of a new member into the "statewide" banking mar-
ket now controlled by the Bank of America, United California Bank, and
First Western Bank, and concluded that the "present oligopoly resulting
from the operations of the three statewide banks mentioned would thus be
somewhat thinned by the entry of Crocker-Citizens into this field." 63 The
merger was consummated.
As this Comment goes to press, the government has just completed sub-
mission of its case to the trial court.
F. Calumet National
Between Chicago and Gary is the city of Hammond, Indiana. In 1963 the
largest bank in the city, the Calumet National Bank of Hammond, and a
close second largest, the Mercantile National Bank of Hammond, petitioned
the Comptroller for approval to merge. The resulting bank would control
80% of the deposits and 81% of the loans in Hammond. If the relevant geo-
graphic market were expanded to include the far-southside of Chicago and
far-south suburbs, Gary, and twelve surrounding Indiana towns, the result-
ing institution would be the second largest in that area and would control
approximately one-fifth of the commercial banking business in that locale.64
Nonetheless, the Comptroller approved over unanimous agency and Jus-
tice Department objections. Justice immediately filed its Clayton §7 and
Sherman §1 complaint in the Northern District of Indiana.6 5 Philadelphia
had just been decided by the Supreme Court; Lexington was pending. The
case more resembled Lexington. The Comptroller reconsidered and with-
drew approval. Shortly thereafter a Justice Department motion to dismiss
was granted. It was all over before it began.
G. Third National Bank in Nashville
In 1964 The Third National Bank in Nashville was the city's second largest
(assets: $340 million). The fourth largest, Nashville Bank and Trust Co.
In accepting this argument the court distinguished it from that rejected in Philadel-
phia, that the merged banks would be better equipped to compete with the giants in the
same market. Here, the merger would result in the entry of the bank into a new market.
64TRADE REG. REP. 45,063 (Case 1758), at 52,534. In this expanded geographic area Calu-
met was fourth largest and Mercantile fifth.
1 United States v. The Calumet National Bank of Hammond and Mercantile National
Bank of Hammond. Civil No. 3723, N.D. Ind., Oct. 10, 1963.
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(assets $45 million), was observably in decline.66 Nashville Bank had been
bought by an insurance syndicate. Recognizing the need for a capital trans-
fusion but at the same time unwilling to divert the necessary funds, the own-
ers sought a merger prospect. Third National was an available customer.
Management succession was a particularly acute problem in this case. The
president of Nashville Bank was ill and anxious to retire. Inadequate em-
ployee benefits and low salaries had discouraged young talent. The bank was
not competitive, its future not bright.
The Comptroller and state superintendent approved the merger petition,
despite adverse competitive reports issued by the FRB, the FDIC, and Jus-
tice.6 7 In August, 1964, following the approval Justice filed its Clayton §7 and
Sherman §1 complaint in the Middle District of Tennessee. 8 At the hearing
for a preliminary injunction the government invoked Philadelphia and Lex-
ington, both of which the court effortlessly distinguished. Here, the court
said, the banks were not of comparable size, and both had "antitrust clean
hands" (i.e. were merger virgins). Present in Lexington, the court pointed
out, was "a purpose to monopolize rather than to satisfy business require-
ments, . ., consumer demands, etc." Moreover, a large quantitative distinc-
tion existed. The injunction was denied.
The Comptroller moved to intervene under Rule 24 (a) (2) of the FED-
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, or, in the alternative, under Rule 24 (b)
(2).69 The motion was denied. The court reasoned, first, that after Philadel-
phia a merger must clear "two separate and distinct hurdles," i.e. the agen-
cies and the courts. Because these are distinct hurdles, the agency has no fur-
66 The bank was losing depositors to larger banks in Nashville. In the first quarter of
1964 deposits had declined about 11%. Third National, on the other hand, was a relatively
large commercial bank. One-fifth of its deposits were in accounts of correspondents; its
loan structure was 40% commercial and only 1% real estate. Nashville's correspondent de-
posits were only 1% of its total, and its loan structure was 27% commercial and 34% real
estate. United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville and Nashville Bank and Trust
Co. Civil No. 3849, M.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 1964, Memorandum Opinion Aug. 18, 1964.
11 "When a bank such as the merging bank is not disposed to compete, it is idle to speak
of the elimination of competition by merger...
"... The competition for funds in the Nashville community is not confined to commer-
cial banks. It must be noted that savings and loan associations are particularly strong com-
petitors." Comptroller's opinion extracted in the Memorandum Opinion of the court,
supra.
61 Civil No. 3849, M.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 1964.
11 The pertinent language of the two sections is as follows:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action:...
(2) When the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be
inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action.
(b) ....
(2) When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or
executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency upon
any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute
or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to inter-
vene in the action.
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ther "interest" to "represent" after the matter has passed on to the courts.
Second, the court found that Rule 24 (b) (2) was clearly discretionary and
that the banks' interests could be "vigorously and adequately represented
without the necessity of the Comptroller's intervention."
As this Comment goes to press Nashville stands at the discovery stage with
a trial date tentatively set at January 10, 1966.
H. Mercantile Trust
The Mercantile Trust Co., a wholesale bank, 70 the largest bank in Missouri,
negotiates one-fifth in dollar-volume of the bank loans in metropolitan St.
Louis.7 ' It agreed to merge in July, 1965, with the Security Trust Co. of St.
Louis, a retail bank, seventh largest in the metropolitan area. The relation
between the two was roughly the converse of the Manufacturers-Hanover
relation: here, a dominant wholesale bank assumed a smaller retail institu-
tion. The merger plan contained an unusual twist-this would be a "cash
merger", a rarity among bank mergers. Under the agreement, Security share-
holder interests would be satisfied, not with shares of the resulting institution,
but with cash though a corresponding capital reduction on the part of Mer-
cantile. One purpose for this move suggests itself. The arrangement, argu-
ably, fits through the narrow hole left in Clayton §7 by Philadelphia.7 2 This is,
conceivably, Justice Brennan's "pure asset acquisition," or a fair imitation
thereof.
The Comptroller approved the merger in June, 1965, over adverse re-
ports by both agencies and the Justice Department. He found the merger,
as a pure assets acquisition, not controlled by Philadelphia. Sherman §1 was
ruled out quantitatively. The opinion stressed the fact that banks receive
non-bank competition (e.g. savings and loan associations, the Comptroller's
bdte noire) in virtually every service rendered save demand deposits, an
argument clearly rejected in Philadelphia. Justice limited the relevant geo-
graphic area to downtown St. Louis; the Comptroller's opinion, however,
70 Of its $530 million in deposits, 18% represents correspondent accounts. Over 60% of its
deposits represents accounts of over $100,000 held for nationwide customers; only 7% of
its deposits represent local accounts under $10,000.
Disagreement between Justice and the Comptroller over the choice of relevant geo-
graphic market causes some confusion in these figures. For example, the Comptroller found
Security Trust seventh largest; the government complaint places it fifth. The figures given
for the individual banks are computed on the basis of the metropolitan area. (Comptroller)
Below, post merger figures are stated using St. Louis proper as a base. (Justice)
7 Justice disagrees, however. It considers the case governed by both Philadelphia and
Lexington. Justice is probably correct. The Supreme Court ruling in Philadelphia is not
grounded in the exchange of assets for stock, as opposed to cash purchases of stock, but in
the fact that a merger was involved. "So construed, the specific exemption for acquiring
corporations not subject to the FTC's jurisdiction excludes from the coverage of § 7 only
assets acquisitions by such corporations when not accomplished by merger." Philadelphia,
supra note 26.
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found different geographic markets for each banking service.7 3 Thus, while
the retail deposit market was confined to metropolitan St. Louis, the large-
loan market was considered national.
Following the Comptroller's approval, Justice filed its standard Clayton
§7 and Sherman §1 complaint in the Eastern District of Missouri. The com-
plaint alleged that the resulting bank would have 35% of the bank deposits
and 37% of the bank loans in St. Louis.74 It further charged an existing state
of high concentration in the market, that the two largest banks in St. Louis
control over half of St. Louis' bank business. The Comptroller moved to in-
tervene as a party defendant. No doubt to his surprise, the motion was
granted.
A motion for preliminary injunction was denied by Judge Harper. In an
analysis similar to the court's in Crocker-Citizens the Missouri district court
found that the complaint distorted the relevant market. Conceding that, on
limiting the relevant geographic area to St. Louis proper, the joint 35% con-
trol of local deposits would exceed the Philadelphia 30% rule of thumb, the
court held the entire metropolitan area the effective arena. The Comptrol-
ler's statistics won the first round, and the merger was consummated shortly
thereafter. As in Continental Illinois the stakes here are high. In Missouri
branching is highly restricted.75 Hence, if the merger is struck down when the
dust finally settles, Mercantile will be virtually unable to use the divesting
technique of "spinning-off" branches and will face agonies similar to those
Continental has suffered for its sins.
As this Comment goes to press Mercantile stands at the early discovery
stages.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
When Manufacturers was decided, we are told, the howl that went up on
Wall Street was heard in every congressional district. Within a month of that
decision Senator Robertson introduced S. 1698, a bill designed to undo these
merger cases. The bill would add an additional sentence to the Bank Merger
Act, making the approving authority vested in the three banking agencies
"exclusive and plenary" and would relieve mergers76 so approved from the
7 The approval of the Comptroller was drafted while the ink was still wet on the Southern
District's opinion in Manufacturers Hanover. The influence of that latter decision on the
Comptroller's Mercantile Trust approval is evident. For example, see Judge MacMahon's
treatment of the relevant geographic markets relative to various banking services. Manu-
facturers, supra note 48, at 80,751.
7' Mr. Saxon disagrees: "After the merger, the resulting bank will ostensibly hold 21.4
percent of the area [?] deposits and 23.6 percent of the area loans." ANTITRUST & TR. REC.
REP. No. 209, July 6, 1965 A-11, 13.
75VERNON'S MO. STATS. § 362.155 (1951).
70It should be pointed out that these bills define the term "merger" as "any transaction
requiring the approval of a Federal banking supervisory agency pursuant to § 18(c) of the
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operation of the antitrust laws, prospectively and retroactively. Section 2 of
the bill would relieve federally insured banks from the threat of antitrust
suits concerning mergers approved by the appropriate federal or state bank-
ing agencies before the enactment of the Bank Merger Act. The Senate Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency requested a report on the bill from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, whose chairman replied favorably. Noting the element
of surprise to the industry in Philadelphia and the policy behind avoiding
protracted bank merger litigation, he concluded that legislative action was
needed. He concluded his statement, however, with the suggestion:
Should the Congress, however, be unable to agree on the approach to the prob-
lem proposed in S. 1698, it might wish to consider other, although less positive,
measures. One such possibility would be to amend the Bank Merger Act to allow
a specific time necessary for the filing of an antitrust action in court to prevent
consummation of an approved transaction, after which, in the absence of such
an action, the merger could be consummated and would be exempt from the
antitrust laws. Because the Attorney General receives ample notice of pending
mergers under the procedure in the Act for the submission of competitive fac-
tors reports, the specified period should be relatively short.
77
That Chairman Martin intended this alternative suggestion as a purely
secondary one is apparent. S. 1698 was in trouble from the outset.78 Opposi-
tion to the unamended bill was expected from at least four members of the
subcommittee itself,7 9 as well as sundry lobbies, such as the Independent
Bankers Association of America. These difficulties, coupled with uncertain
White House support of the bill, prompted the alternative. In his statement,
however, Chairman Martin hastened to add:
Such an alternative, however, would be a less positive approach than S. 1698.
Moreover, such an alternative, unfortunately, would incorporate specifically
into the Bank Merger Act two different-and logically inconsistent-standards
for bank mergers. Indeed, the Department of Justice would be obliged by the
antitrust laws to intervene to block a bank merger in the very same circumstances
in which a federal banking agency would be required by another act of Con-
gress-the Bank Merger Act-to approve the transaction. Thus, two arms of the
Government, carrying out their statutory duties, would work at cross purposes,
with banks and the communities they serve caught in the legal crossfire.
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The Supreme Court has not hesitated to use the terms
"merger" and "consolidation" interchangeably, when the matter in question did not hinge
on the technical distinction. Cf. Philadelphia, supra note 26, at 332, n.7. In this Comment
the two terms are used in the same manner.
77See the report issued by the Federal Reserve Board on April 27, 1965, printed in Hear-
ings on S.1698 before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) 7,8. This may well be the first pub-
lished mention of what was to become the "Proxmire Amendment."
7 The opposition of Chairman Patman of the House Banking and Currency Committee
was considered a formidable obstacle at this stage.
70 Senators Douglas, Muskie, Proxmire, and Thurman.
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Clearly, this sort of conflict should be avoided, as it would be by the enact-
ment of S. 1698.80
Because of the growing opposition and because he wanted prompt action,
Senator Robertson yielded to the "Proxmire Amendment" which effectively
gutted the entire bill. Senator Proxmire's new bill provided that the banking
agency, on approving a merger, shall immediately notify the Attorney Gen-
eral of the approval, and consummation of the transaction shall be suspended
for thirty days. During this interim any antitrust action instituted to enjoin
the transaction will act as an injunction pendente lite. The amended bill in-
cluded a "shotgun" provision,8' and gave antitrust immunity to all mergers
consummated pursuant to this procedure, i.e. immunity unless Justice de-
cided otherwise.
The bill was a clear compromise. It retained the effect of immunizing from
antitrust action all past approved and consummated mergers. At the same
time, however, as to future mergers Justice was placed back in business. The
new overall effect of the bill with respect to future mergers was to impose a
thirty-day "statute of limitations." Thus there appeared a certain disparity
of treatment between past and future mergers.8 2 Of utmost importance, how-
ever, the bill was one the entire Senate committee could approve. On June
8, 1965, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency unanimously re-
ported the bill favorably. 83
In a brief report the committee apologetically explained its proposed treat-
ment of future mergers:
The committee recognizes that the bill as reported involves a substan-
tial change from the procedures contemplated when the Bank Merger Act was
adopted. At that time it was clearly expected that the decision of the responsible
Federal banking authority, based on its own investigation and on reports on
competitive factors from the other two banking agencies and from the Depart-
ment of Justice, would be final and conclusive. The Attorney General's report
was expected to be advisory only.
80Hearings, supra note 77, at 14.
81 "Provided further, that when the agency finds that it must act immediately in order to
prevent the probable failure of one of the banks and reports on the competitive factors in-
volved may be dispensed with, the transaction may be consummated immediately upon ap-
proval by the agency: And provided further, That, when an emergency exists requiring
expeditious action and reports on the competitive factors are requested within ten days,
the transaction may not be consummated within less than five calendar days after approval
by the agency."
a2 The Attorney General, in testimony before the House subcommittee on August 18, 1965,
characterized the measure as "a private bill for the relief of parties . . . to six pending
suits," a charge that has become the shibboleth of the bill's opposition. For a legislative re-
sponse to the charge, see note 57, supra.
8 S. REP. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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The committee recognized that the bill places in the hands of the Justice De-
partment a considerable measure of authority which the committee expects will
be used with care and discretion. The committee is aware that many banks pro-
posing to merge under an approval by the Federal banking authorities might
feel compelled to abandon their merger plans at the mere threat of a suit by the
Justice Department, however insubstantial the basis for such a suit might be.
The opportunity afforded to the Justice Department by the 30-day waiting pe-
riod must be used with a full understanding and appreciation of the special cir-
cumstances applicable to the field of banking and with due consideration for
the authority vested by the Congress in the Federal banking authorities to ap-
prove or disapprove mergers on the basis of their expert knowledge of the bank-
ing field and the judgment on which they base their decision that a merger is
in the public interest.
84
Having failed in its attempt to find an acceptable tool to eliminate a cause
of action, the committee settled for issuing policy directives. Commentators
were critical of the compromise:
The Senate Committee recognized this danger and urged the Department to
file suits with "care and discretion." The mere necessity to utter this caution is
the provision's own condemnation. In effect, the automatic injunction gives
Justice a practical permanent veto.
Attorney General Katzenbach objects to the 30-day deadline for filing suits as
an undue restraint on Justice. Bankers could object to it as an undue tempta-
tion to Justice. Might it not cause the antitrust division when in doubt and
pressed for time to file an action? Better to be safe than criticized.
The banks get a bad bargain in this quid pro quo. ...
... now I am convinced that, if banks ... can't get the original Robertson
proposal, they're better off with the status quo.S5
The legislation in no way affects Clayton §7 or Sherman §1. Nor will it
affect the Supreme Court's rulings on the Bank Merger Act and primary
jurisdiction. Presumably, then, in those mergers Justice does challenge
Philadelphia and Lexington will be controlling law.
The amended bill passed the Senate on June 11, 1965.
Shortly after the original Robertson bill had been introduced in the Sen-
ate, Rep. Harvey introduced in the House an identical measure as H.R.
7563. An alternative bill, H.R. 8388, was then introduced by Rep. Moorhead
as something of a middleground between the original and amended Robert-
son bills. The provision would make agency approval final and conclusive of
81 Id., at 7-8.
85J. A. Livingston, "Business Outlook ... Justice Bank Merger Veto Challenged." The
Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1965, p. B9.
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antitrust laws on the happening of any of four events: (A) an agency deter-
mination of emergency situation; (B) failure of the Attorney General to in-
dicate within seven days of publication of approval an intention to bring
action; (C) failure of the Attorney General to bring the action within thirty
days; (D) termination of such action by any final judgment, decree, etc., not
barring the merger. The Moorhead bill also acts retroactively.
One distinction is noteworthy. Here is the introduction of the "Proxmire
amendment" in a House bill. Unlike the Senate bill, however, it provides that
an administrative finding of emergency insulates the proposed merger alto-
gether. In the Senate version such a finding would allow Justice seven days
in which to file the tolling complaint.
Senate hearings had been relatively brief-overly hasty, some had
thought.8 6 By contrast the House hearings promised to be slow and pro-
tracted. The Attorney General in testimony excoriated the Senate bill; the
hearings droned on; Rep. Patman announced he would not report a bill out
until "a complete and thorough record had been built."
At this juncture, with the probabilities of passage before adjournment
growing dim, another alternative was proposed. In mid-September Congress-
man Todd introduced a further concession. His bill, H.R. 11033, in sub-
stance the final Senate bill, extends the thirty-day limbo period and the five-
day emergency period to ninety days and ten days respectively. The change
answers only one-and a rather insubstantial-objection, that Justice is given
insufficient time to act. As existing law requires the agencies to solicit Justice
Department views prior to approval, it is highly doubtful that Justice could
be taken totally by surprise. While it might be argued that the extended
time provides a longer "cooling-off" period for Justice and would tend to
curb a "better-litigate-than-be-criticized" policy, that it would actually
achieve this result seems tenuously shown. The argument for ninety days
lacks merit.
In mid-September Rep. Ashley introduced H.R. 11011. This measure
would in effect repeal the Bank Merger Act and offer a substitute. The ad-
ministrative approval procedure would be reinacted in substantially its pres-
ent form. Such approval would be made "exclusive and plenary, and any
transaction approved ... shall be conclusively presumed to be not in viola-
tion of the [antitrust laws]." (The inflammatory word "exempt" is eliminated
and in its place the approved transaction is bestowed a conclusive presump-
tion of legitimacy.) A noticeable change is made in the administrative proc-
ess. Hearings are to be held prior to approval, and any competing bank may
be made a party to the proceedings.
'*See, e.g., remark of Sen. Douglas, Hearings, supra note 77, at 149. Attorney General
Katzenbach, in testimony before the House Subcommittee indicated similar views.
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The approving order is suspended for 31 days after publication, during
which interim the Justice Department or any aggrieved party may obtain
review of the order in the circuit courts of appeal by filing such an appeal
within that period. The filing operates as a stay of the agency's order-unless
the agency has, on a finding of emergency, specifically ruled otherwise, or un-
less the court itself rules otherwise. The circuit court's jurisdiction becomes
exclusive on the filing of the administrative record, and the agency's findings
of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Provision is made
for supplementary findings in appropriate situations. The judgment of the
circuit court is made final, subject to Supreme Court review on certiorari.
The bill grants retroactive immunity to all mergers consummated and not
challenged before the enactment of this act.
Indirect provision is made for the four pending cases, Continental Illinois,
Crocker-Citizens, Nashville, and Mercantile. The courts are directed to apply
the substantive criteria demanded of the agencies; these are the famous seven
factors:
(A) the financial history and condition of each of the banks involved,
(B) the adequacy of its capital structure,
(C) its future earnings prospects,
(D) the convenience and needs of the community to be served,
(E) the effect of the transaction on competition, including any tendency to-
ward monopoly, as reported by the Attorney General pursuant to para-
graph (5),
(F) whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this
Act,
(G) such other factors as the responsible agency may deem relevant.
The act requires the agency to determine whether, after considering all seven
of these factors, the transaction is in the public interest. The provision should
be held to have clearly overruled Philadelphia and Lexington with respect
to these pending provisions. The Supreme Court discussed in passing, with-
out thorough analysis, the public policy considerations behind application
of Clayton §7 and Sherman §1 to banking as an industry. It made, however,
no pretense of applying an overall "in-the-public-interest" test to such trans-
actions. Indeed, the view it took of §7 and §1 positively precluded such an
analysis.
As this Comment goes to press, The House Committee on Banking and
Currency has not yet reported a bill, and the prospects for its doing so before
adjournment of the first session of the 89th Congress appear extremely slight.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Ashley scheme is the first proposal that makes any sense out of the six-
headed monster. The current contest between the Justice Department and
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the Comptroller of the Currency makes an absorbing spectator sport but a
regulatory travesty. Neither is equipped to serve as a court of last resort.
Philadelphia, Lexington, and Manufacturers Hanover, when read to-
gether, demonstrate that, for practical purposes, a bank merger cannot now
withstand an assault by the Attorney General. A court unwilling to risk sum-
mary reversal is left without choice. The case against the raw Clayton-Sher-
man approach is a stubbornly durable one-the industry is different. Whether
a given merger harms the community or the nation is a truly delicate ques-
tion, one that does not yield to the nostalgic magic of four old railroad cases.
Nor, on the other hand, is the Comptroller the answer. The case for Lex-
ington and Calumet is a difficult one to defend. That the competitive effect
of a merger is not the sole test of its validity, does not make that guideline
immaterial.
With the banks and the communities they serve caught in the middle of
this range war, the situation fairly "cries out loud" for a return to the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction.
J. A. H.
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